


# AIR LAND SEA BULLETIN



*Issue No. 2011-1*

**Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center**

*January 2011*



## **Humanitarian Assistance**

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**Submissions:** We solicit articles and reader's comments. Contributions of 1,500 words or less are ideal. Submit contributions, double-spaced in MS Word. Include name, title, complete unit address, telephone numbers, and e-mail address. Graphics can appear in an article, but you must also provide a separate computer file for each graphic and photograph (photos must be 300 dpi). Send e-mail submissions to [alsadirector@langley.af.mil](mailto:alsadirector@langley.af.mil). ALSA Center reserves the right to edit content to meet space limitations and conform to the *ALSB* style and format.

**Next issue: May 2011. Submission DEADLINE: COB 1 March 2011.** Theme of this issue is "Aviation in Urban Operations."

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Cover photo—A Haitian child carries a meal, ready to eat after receiving it from US Soldiers during an aid drop in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 16 January 2010. The drop was conducted by Soldiers from 1st Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. The Soldiers passed out more than 2,500 meals, ready to eat at that location. (DOD photo by Fred W. Baker III)

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## DIRECTOR'S COMMENTS


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On behalf of the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center, Happy New Year and thank you for your continued support. We closed out 2010 with the addition of one more member, MAJ Michael Saxon, from the Army. For him and the rest of the ALSA team, 2011 promises to be a busy year with 12 publications in the early phases of revision. For those of you unfamiliar with our process, we rely on you, the subject matter experts, to provide the most current lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure our products are relevant and useful. For a complete listing of the publications in revision and points of contact, please see page 33. The newly developed *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Diving Operations* will be released shortly. There are also five publications in the command approval phase nearing release—*Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)*, *Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)*, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)*, *Dynamic Targeting (DT)*, and *Electronic Warfare Reprogramming (EW Reprogramming)*. As always, you can download all of our publications from the ALSA website. The theme for our May 2011 ALSB is “Aviation in Urban Operations” with article submissions due 1 March 2011.

The theme of this ALSB, “Humanitarian Assistance,” gives us a chance to look at a mission area not typically associated with the military. These articles showcase the ingenuity, adaptability, and flexibility of the men and women of the US Armed Forces and how their efforts saved lives and provided necessary assistance. Over a year ago, a devastating earthquake struck Haiti killing hundreds of thousands, and leaving millions without necessities. According to US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), at the peak level, 22,268 military personnel were providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) to Haiti. It is therefore, no coincidence most of our articles deal with Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. Since much of the supplies and personnel arrived through Toussaint Louverture International Airport (ICAO: MTPP/IATA: PAP) in Port-au-Prince, we begin the bulletin with an article focused on operations into and around the airport. Maj Matt Jones was the Deputy Commander and

Director of Operations for the Joint Task Force-Port Opening and gives a firsthand account of life at the airfield. The next article, by Maj Tyrell Mayfield, deals with security issues at the airport and force protection when involved in foreign humanitarian assistance. The third article is from LT Guillermo Carrillo and LT Patrick Mahoney from VAW-125. Originally scheduled to deploy onboard the USS *Carl Vinson*, they were re-tasked to provide airborne command and control for Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. The next article, from Lt Col Stephen Davidson and Maj David Smith, introduces a provisional coalition organization designated the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center (HFOCC) and describes its role in managing the air bridge into Haiti. The fifth article, from Mr. Ricardo Arias of USSOUTHCOM, looks beyond traditional command and control systems when collaborating with non-traditional partners and provides success stories from Haiti on information flow using web-based tools. The next article takes us to the Pakistan flood relief, where Lt Col Shawn Underwood and MSgt Vivian Bender discuss challenges of working in a challenging environment and discuss the establishment of a Joint Air Coordination Cell. The final submission is provided by Ms. Amber Callaway, from the US Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). It provides information on the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course, which is a 2-day course helping military participants become familiar with USAID as well as other US government and international humanitarian organizations involved in HA/DR.

Finally, our intent is for this edition of the ALSB to provide insight and perspective on HA/DR within the military to promote discussions on ways to better conduct humanitarian operations. As usual, if you have any feedback on the ALSB or any of our products, feel free to drop us a line.



**DAVID B. HUME**, Colonel, USAF  
Director

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## CRG EXPERIENCE IN HAITI

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USTRANSCOM deployed a Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) commanded by Col Patrick Hollrah to serve as Senior Airfield Authority for the first 45 days of the international response at Toussaint Louverture International Airport, Haiti. The JTF was made of Airmen from the 817th Contingency Response Group (CRG), McGuire AFB, NJ and Soldiers from the 689th Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE), Fort Eustis, VA. (Photo by MSgt Johnny Vinson, USAF)

**By  
Maj Matt Jones, USAF**

One of the underreported stories of the Haiti relief effort was the success in the first 10 days of preventing complete bottleneck at the Toussaint Louverture International Airport (ICAO: MTPP). Daily takeoffs and landings grew overnight from 18 to 300. This article describes what it was like running an international airport whose volume grew by 1,700 percent overnight.

On the afternoon of 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake shook Port-au-Prince, both the population center and capital of Haiti. Within a matter of seconds upwards of 200,000 people were killed, another 250,000 injured, and 2 million left homeless. Instantly, dozens of countries and hundreds of organizations from around the world began to plan their own relief missions. Haiti is unique in that it has only one international airport, with a single runway and a single taxiway. Furthermore, the seaports were damaged beyond immediate use and overland border crossings with the Dominican Republic were distant

and crowded. Fortunately, the runway and parking ramp at the only international airport were not damaged, but the air traffic control tower and passenger terminal were unsafe for operations. Toussaint Louverture International Airport, crippled but still operational, was now the logistical hub and potential choke-point for the entire international response.

The first Air Force organization to arrive was the 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW) out of Hurlburt Field, Florida. They arrived just over 24 hours after the earthquake hit and brought with them a key ingredient which proved to be extremely valuable over the next 2 weeks: Air Force Combat Controllers. These professional Airmen quickly set up tower operations on folding card tables in the infield of the airport. At the time of their arrival, the Government of Haiti had yet to relinquish control of their airspace or prioritize incoming aircraft. Planes would show up without notice, hold until they ran low on fuel and then either land or divert if there was no longer room to park. Capacity was increased by parking smaller planes

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[MTPP] was now the logistical hub and potential chokepoint for the entire international response.

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on the grass, and velocity was increased by offloading relief cargo onto the tarmac. Despite all of this, many planes and some vital relief equipment and personnel simply had to divert. Less than 24 hours after the Airmen from Hurlburt Field arrived, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) deployed a Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) made up of Airmen from the 817th Contingency Response Group (CRG) out of McGuire AFB, New Jersey, and Soldiers from the 689th Rapid Port Opening Element out of Fort Eustis, Virginia. This JTF, led by Col Patrick Hollrah, assumed Senior Airfield Authority for the next 45 days. The CRG did not have enough air traffic controllers, so the combat controllers continued working tower operations for the 10 busiest days of the operation.

The scene as the CRG arrived was surreal. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had temporarily

restricted arrivals due to unsafe saturation in the immediate air-space. The ramp was deceptively quiet and completely dark. It wasn't until sunrise the next morning we discovered a large hillside just miles away completely black from the loss of electric power. The scent of smoke filled the air, which we later learned was the government incinerating corpses from the catastrophe. There weren't large crowds or rioting as the local population was still tending to their more immediate concerns. The only lights were the ever-increasing international media. For the next week the media not only reported on and from the airport, but also setup camp there for security reasons. They walked across the parking ramp at will. Vehicles drove where normally only planes belong. The grass at the airport was knee-high, but within 5 days would be trampled into dirt. Figure 1 shows the buildup over the first 10 days.

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The ramp was deceptively quiet and completely dark.

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15 Jan 2010



16 Jan 2010



17 Jan 2010



25 Jan 2010



Figure 1. Growth of the JTF-PO cargo holding yard, work center and living quarters, all located between the runway and tarmac at Toussaint Louverture International Airport, Haiti. (15 Jan 2010 satellite imagery provided by DigitalGlobe/all other satellite imagery provided by GeoEye)

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...key to managing perceptions... keeping the Haitian civil airport authorities a part of the process.

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CRG priorities were to immediately begin offloading cargo as it arrived and for our 24 security force Airmen to assess the security situation. The earthquake crumbled portions of 14 sections of the airport's perimeter wall. While three-quarters of our team went to work on the ramp, the rest began to setup camp so within 18 hours we could put some Airmen to bed who had been up for 36 hours. The single most important decision we made in the first 2 hours was where to lay our cornerstone for the camp and cargo yard. We had already decided operations would be setup somewhere in the grass between the runway and parking ramp. Now, in complete darkness, we had to envision what the camp and airport would soon grow to, keeping in mind runway proximity, flooding and irrigation, vehicle traffic, living space, work space, and our intermediate cargo yard. There would not be an opportunity to relocate later as international teams, US non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other US military units were starting to arrive by the thousands. I was the Deputy Commander and Director of Operations for the JTF-PO. Within 15 hours of our arrival, I attended a meeting with three Airmen and the Haitian Prime Minister, Jean-Max Bellerive. It was at this meeting the Prime Minister, having just talked on the phone with President Obama, decided to "give the US Department of Defense the authority to prioritize fixed wing flight arrivals and departures." Once we obtained the official memorandum, it had a hand written note saying, "Each party will have the authority to terminate this agreement." We fully understood the sensitivities of the US military taking control of another country's airport. Within 1 day from the time we were given control of the airport, the international media was already reporting the US was launching another invasion and giving

preferences to US military arrivals. This misinformation went viral as seen by the following quotes:

*"I want to express the indignation of the Bolivian people at the US government's decision to send troops instead of aid to the people of Haiti."*

- President Evo Morales of Bolivia

*"The empire is shamelessly taking over Haiti over the corpses and the tears of the Haitian people."*

- President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela

As the above quotes and sentiments were being widely reported, we realized time was short to reverse the damage being caused by 40 to 50 daily diverts. We knew the key to managing perceptions and effective execution revolved around keeping the Haitian civil airport authorities a part of the process. Our first decision was to cannibalize our soon-to-be built shower tent and convert it into base operations. We devoted a make-shift work station for the Government of Haiti, the United Nations World Food Program, and an FAA representative. While we didn't have a shower for another 10 days, we had immediately brought the key stakeholders into the team and subsequent decision-making processes. It took 15 days for this function to fully come together, but a sense of trust and commitment came almost instantly. Over the next 4 days we hosted airport user-group meetings with Haitians, the UN, international participants, and US NGOs. These 2-a-day meetings became so popular they were soon relocated to the Haitian approach control conference room. An immediate positive outcome was setting aside 6 hours a night where the Haitian Prime Minister could sponsor short notice, high priority arrivals. While these 6-hour blocks were vastly under-utilized, they demonstrated our commitment to Haiti's sovereignty and gave us the flexibility and credibility to succeed.

Aircraft volume peaked 4 days into the operation with well over 150 daily arrivals. Our aerial port cargo off-load teams had enough equipment and manpower to concurrently work three aircraft, while sustained demand was for six. They were often forced to hand-offload international 747s and IL-76s floor loaded (not palletized) with thousands of five-gallon jugs of water and bags of rice. During this same time a massive American citizen evacuation mission was emerging. The CRG pulled already short-staffed aerial port offload teams from the flight line to run this new high priority mission. The passenger terminal was unsafe for use due to the earthquake damage. Each and every passenger had to be hand-manifested and most were ultimately strapped to the floors of C-17s with cargo straps. Over 15,000 were evacuated, including almost 1,000 adopted toddlers and infants. Throughout all of this, our mobile ops center provided command and control and event tracking for every arrival. This same team of one officer and four NCOs answered 400 daily satellite phone calls, 100 in-person queries from onsite international responders and US NGOs. They were the sole source for all Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE airlift and passenger reporting. Many US servicemen arrived without adequate food and shelter, so the CRG camp expanded from 150 to over 300 people to accommodate.

By day five, the security and media situation were at their breaking point. Each morning thousands of Haitians showed up to the airport looking for jobs. We still had only 24 Airmen (12 per shift) to keep the security as it would be another 3 days before reinforcements would arrive. I've never been more impressed than watching 21 year old 1-strippers keeping order in an increasingly desperate situation. At night there were constant breaches of the fractured perimeter. We began detaining, then releasing upwards of

60 Haitians each day. Exercising amazing restraint and verbal judo there were no fights, injuries, or violence at the airport.

While security reinforcements were en route, the international media's unrestricted access was becoming problematic. Since most of the worldwide media chose to live under the security of the airport, there was significantly increased pedestrian traffic in close proximity to moving aircraft. On one occasion the media had hired local Haitians as personal security. The next day dozens of jobless citizens showed up with shotguns looking for work. On day six, with the concurrence of the Haitian government, we severely limited the access of the international media to what you would expect at an international airport. We toiled over this decision as we were aware of the possible backlash in public reporting which may ensue. Much to our surprise, within 1 day of removing the media from the airport operating environment, complaints and negative stories completely disappeared. This was the single turning point in restoring order. Ironically, it was also the most difficult decision we made.

There were two other challenges I have concluded are common to these types of humanitarian relief operations. The first is the insatiable appetite for information from the highest levels of the US military and government overall. The second is the challenge of getting the required resources when they are needed most—the first 10 days.

The appetite for information is understandable, but has its most deleterious effect on those with "ground truth" information. Unfortunately these are the same people chartered with running the operation. In the case of the operation at the airport, there was a very complex command and control arrangement. The US response at the airport was led by the United States Agency for

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The next day dozens of jobless citizens showed up with shotguns looking for work.

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...challenge in involving so many different units is they all serve two to three different masters.

International Development (USAID), who in turn reached out to US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). USSOUTHCOM in turn initially reached out to US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) (1 SOW), then USTRANSCOM (JTF-PO & CRG) who were remotely assisted by US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) (601<sup>st</sup> Air Operations Center [AOC]). The biggest challenge involving so many different units is they all serve two to three different masters. We were fortunate as we assumed Senior Airfield Authority from the 1 SOW, their leadership remained onsite and attended most embassy meetings and press conferences. This allowed the CRG leadership to focus on safe airfield operations and accurate data reporting.

The other challenge to highlight is a resource mismatch. The initial re-

sources needed to maximize throughput are as simple as forklifts, K-loaders, and trained manpower. The greatest demand for these resources is the first week of the humanitarian response. If there is much delay in getting these resources in place, the demand will begin to fall and you will just as quickly have too many men and too much equipment. The latter problem is simply too much insurance, but the former can cost lives. Figure 2 depicts both the demand and available resources in the first month of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE.

This figure is a powerful illustration of the resource mismatch challenge. For the first week of the international response to the Haiti earthquake, there was simply not enough equipment on hand for the increased demand at the airport.




Figure 2. Graph shows demand and available resources in the first month of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. Working MOG (maximum on the ground) is the maximum number of aircraft you can simultaneously service (onload and offload of cargo and passengers).

The impact of this is longer ground times for aircraft, less throughput of cargo, and a decision to assume more risk from the men and women running the operation (longer shifts and working faster). The primary reason for the delay in getting the equipment in place was higher priority airlift (82d Airborne). I can say with certainty the airlift of the 82d Airborne would have closed out sooner if something as simple as forklifts was given a higher priority. With 9 months of perspective, I now believe this is the most important lesson learned because it has the most immediate effect of increasing life saving supplies in the first week when they are needed most.

I believe there are two final areas that are open items in the event the DOD is called on again to assist in a similar response. The first is the role the 601 AOC played in allocating slots. I comment on their phenomenal contributions as we were most impacted by their new mission. The military typically accomplishes slot management by using an Air Force military software program called GDSS2. This tool is not adequate when 85% of the missions are not even in the military database. We were lucky in Haiti-95% of all arrivals passed through the FAA's airspace. The FAA gave us a login to their web situational display system that was our primary visibility tool on the variety of arrivals we were working. This, combined with Excel spreadsheets, ruled the day. I suggest the DOD and USAID develop a more durable and flexible web-based application which can be pulled off the shelf to manage prioritization and slot management of many commercial, military, and international users.

The second open item is codifying what unit in the DOD should get

called on to augment, open, and immediately operate an airfield seeing 150 daily arrivals. In Haiti, the first unit called on was the 1 SOW out of Hurlburt Field. They were called on because of their highly trained tower controllers (combat controllers), geographic proximity to Haiti, and existing relationship with USSOUTHCOM. They performed magnificently. However, USTRANSCOM always has 150 Airmen and Soldiers sitting alert to perform this exact mission. I quickly concede the CRG did not have adequate tower controllers to accomplish the mission on their own, but did have all the other pieces to open and operate this airfield. I suggest three things to allow a more immediate and synchronized response for this type of mission into the future:

1. Every combatant command needs to know there is always a CRG and/or JTF-PO sitting world-wide alert to open and operate airfields.

2. The CRGs need more air traffic controllers to cover 24-hour operations in a bare-base environment.

3. The CRGs should begin training with highly specialized units like the 1 SOW out of Hurlburt Field.

Thirty-one million pounds of cargo; 6,000 mishap-free sorties; and 15,000 evacuated American Citizens later...Toussaint Louverture International Airport had grown by 1,700 percent. Within a few days bottlenecks disappeared and some semblance of order was restored. The international reports of occupation and manipulation had died just as quickly as they were born. Three very unique Air Force units and four combatant commands came together in an unprecedented way.

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...the airlift of the 82d Airborne would have closed out sooner if something as simple as forklifts was given a higher priority.

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## SECURITY IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

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823d Security Forces Squadron deploying to Haiti, January 2010. (Photo by A1C Benjamin Wiseman, USAF)

**By  
Major Tyrell O. Mayfield, USAF**

*"For the joint force, force protection is a high priority. Even in a permissive environment, the joint force can expect to encounter banditry, vandalism, and various levels of violent activities from criminals or unruly crowds."*

—JP 3-29: Foreign  
Humanitarian Assistance

Twice in the last 5 years the Department of Defense (DOD) has called on the 820th Security Forces Group (SFG) to secure, open, and ensure the continued operation of critical airheads during contingencies in order to conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. In 2005, the 822d Security Forces Squadron (SFS) deployed to New Orleans to secure Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport following hurricane Katrina. More recently, the 823 SFS deployed to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in the wake of the massive

earthquake in January 2010 to secure Toussaint Louverture International Airport (ICAO: MTPP).

A contingent from the 1st Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, FL, landed within hours of the earthquake and with 78 Airmen assumed initial command and control of the airfield. However, a more robust capability was needed quickly. The unit of choice to open and operate airfields in contingency response (permissive or semi-permissive) is an Air Force contingency response group (CRG). The 817 CRG from McGuire AFB, NJ, deployed to control flight and aerial port operations meeting the requirements for a Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) team.

The CRG immediately organized the ramp, bringing order and movement to thousands of tons of cargo. Now operational, the airport became the focal point for all inbound aid, cargo, medical supplies, and personnel entering Haiti. Government, international, and private aid organ-

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...the joint force can expect to encounter banditry, vandalism, and various levels of violent activities...

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izations flocked to the airport due to its perceived safety and security. Large quantities of aid and resources—high demand items in the city—moved through the airport. This presented a very specific risk of looting, due to a still-porous perimeter and insufficient guard force at the airport. Security quickly became a concern as the situation in Port-au-Prince grew tense. Additionally, the Department of State had begun to evacuate thousands of American citizens utilizing returning Air Force cargo aircraft. This proved to be an irresistible opportunity for some Haitians to attempt to exit the country illegally. The CRG required a more robust and dedicated force to secure the airport in order to allow cargo and flight operations to continue unimpeded.

The 820 SFG, one of the only ground units in the Air Force task-organized to provide both deployment *and* on-call forces, utilized its on-call squadron, the 823 SFS, to fill this critical requirement. Within days of the earthquake and hours of the official notification of tasking, the 823d forward-deployed a 69-person advance party to bolster the CRG's security efforts at MTPP. Simultaneously, Twelfth Air Force established and began to man the 24th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG) to provide a more permanent presence for HA/DR operations.

The value of having an on-call, fully integrated ground combat force to support expeditionary air forces was underscored with the deployment of the 823d. Deploying as a complete squadron provided the 823d an advantage over other AEF forces and allowed them to arrive in country as the first complete and functioning squadron of the newly established 24 AEG. Although the CRG commander retained lead role as the Senior Airfield Authority, the 823d under command of the 24 AEG assumed responsibility for overall security of MTPP upon their arrival.

Security was the first core responsibility transferred from the CRG to the AEG. All told, 160 Airmen of the 823d deployed to secure MTPP. Additionally, 20 members of the 820th Combat Operations Squadron and 4 members of the 820 SFG headquarters deployed to Haiti supporting the initial stand up of the AEG headquarters, filling critical staff and force protection advisory positions.

*“Regardless of the environment, security must be factored into force requirements and support capability. In FHA operations, sustainment forces will require a substantial amount of their troops to protect unit and individual property.”*

—JP 3-29: Foreign  
Humanitarian Assistance

A large security force was required to safely control and operate the airport. The 820th fielded 184 personnel in the opening days of the contingency. Posts included entry control, ramp access and circulation, close boundary security, marshalling and staging of evacuees, command and control operations, pass and registration, and conducting liaison operations with the joint, inter-agency, and partner nation counterparts involved in the relief effort. The ability of Airmen to operate effectively in such a dynamic environment is critical.

Recent experience conducting counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan honed skills which translated quickly to the disaster relief effort. Our Airmen have learned to be more astute observers, considering culture, environment, and intent before acting on inputs. Airmen have also become much more adept at integrating interpreters into daily operations and managing the information gathered from these encounters to their advantage. Finally, the strict escalation of force training, access to, and familiarity with less than lethal

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...organizations flocked to the airport due to its perceived safety and security.

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options for defusing hostile situations have improved significantly in recent years and translated directly to the humanitarian mission in Haiti.

The 823d secured the airport perimeter and thousands of Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H) and international military, aid, relief, and recovery personnel bedded down at the airport. Squadron experts conducted initial airfield antiterrorism and vulnerability assessments, providing keen insight to the AEG and CRG leadership on the security situation and threats facing the JTF. The command element of the 823d analyzed vulnerabilities and known threats, and specifically employed resources and personnel to counter them.

The 823d quickly identified security deficiencies and implemented solutions, which not only ensured the security and safety of ramp and flight line operations but also facilitated the efficient movement of cargo and supplies from MTPP to where it was most needed. Controlling ramp entry and traffic flow became the highest priority. The 823d partnered with the Haitian Airport Authority and quickly vetted all employees, built entry authorization lists, and issued interim badges with the cooperation of the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to properly identify employees and agents who required access to the ramp.

Crowd control became another large challenge for the security of the airport. The 823d deployed four organic military working dog (MWD) teams to Haiti. These teams exponentially enhanced the security presence by conducting mounted and dismounted patrols, listening and observation posts, random vehicle and baggage checks, and also calmed or dispersed crowds through their presence at entry control points (ECPs). MWDs proved to be one of the most effective tools in the

opening days for controlling crowds and restoring calm to volatile situations.

Operations in Haiti presented a truly joint and combined environment. The array of players spanned nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Haitian government agencies, the United Nations (UN), Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, TSA, all branches of the US military, and a robust showing of international militaries. This dynamic mix provided very unique and challenging coordination requirements. Coordination was very often personality driven, and building relationships in the interagency realm proved a critical task for the successful operation of the airhead. Unlike our traditional air bases in deployed locations, the airport in Port-au-Prince faced a different set of threats and served many customers.

Restricting access and controlling circulation on the ramp drives entirely different requirements and methods to accommodate nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations who hire local workers without photo identification as day-laborers to haul supplies and equipment off the airfield. The 823d attended "cluster meetings" with NGOs and UN representatives and daily security updates hosted by the UN. Perhaps the most important meeting was the daily airport meeting, bringing together airport users and providers. In this meeting, problems were identified, solutions were presented, and a number of important issues were quickly resolved. The 823d filled a critical role as the liaison and representative of the 24 AEG at many of these meetings. The one issue which all parties were concerned about and interested in supporting was security.

The 820th remains the Air Force's premier unit for defending airfields in any environment. Unlike traditional security squadrons, the 820th

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MWDs proved to be one of the most effective tools...

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fields a robust security capability, fully staffed headquarters, organic intelligence, medical, communications, and vehicle maintenance capabilities. It is able to stand on its own and remain self sufficient in even the most austere environments. With a depth of three line squadrons, one support squadron, and a standing group headquarters, the 820 SFG provides a robust on-call capability to meet the needs of the DOD across the full spectrum of operations.

### Key Lessons Learned

— Security units must maintain qualifications on less than lethal weapon systems.

— Military working dogs were a force multiplier and had an immediate impact on crowd control, security, and stabilization of the airport.

— Initial response forces to HA/DR operations must plan to be

completely self-sustaining with food, water, and shelter for 7-10 days.

— Early liaison with NGOs, UN, and other government agencies as well as both joint and international military counterparts is critical to gaining a complete picture. Consider establishing a dedicated liaison team to attend meetings and serve as an information focal point.

— Do not underestimate the requirement for an enduring security presence and a constantly shifting array of threats to personnel and resources in a humanitarian crisis.

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Do not underestimate the requirement for an enduring security presence...

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***At the time of writing, the 820th Security Forces Group and its subordinate squadrons were going through a redesignation and name change. As of 1 October they are now the 820th Base Defense Group, 820th Combat Operations Squadron, 822nd, 823d, and 824th Base Defense Squadrons.***



Haitians waiting for travel to the United States sit secured to the floor of a C-17 Globemaster III cargo aircraft during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE 18 Feb 2010, at Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The 17th Airlift Squadron from Charleston Air Force Base volunteered to transport passengers who otherwise would have had to wait hours or even days for another flight to the United States. (Photo by SSgt Shawn Weismiller, USAF)



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## UNIFIED RESPONSE—A HAWKEYE PERSPECTIVE

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Tigertail 602 from VAW-125 conducting airborne turnover near Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. (Photo by LT Jon Sitorius, USN)

**By**  
**LT Guillermo “Paco” Carrillo, USN**  
**and**  
**LT Patrick “MIA” Mahoney, USN**

“Charlie Papa, Tiger 97, we are airborne from Gitmo and proceeding to station. 4+30 on station time. Standing by for tasking.” As one radio starts squawking, another starts, then another. The tasking starts with supplies such as medicine, food, and water. Then come the MEDEVACs [medical evacuations]... H-60s are moving sick and injured people from outlying landing zones (LZs) in Haiti to the USNS *COMFORT*, some makeshift triage centers, or other field hospitals. We keep the 15-20 helos under our control working nonstop. The commanders on USS *CARL VINSON* and the team in Port-au-Prince (PAP) need information now. Suddenly, all LZs are closed because there is no one to move the rescue

supplies from the LZs to the people in need. Helos are airborne with supplies but have nowhere to take them. Meanwhile, more supplies are flooding into PAP with nowhere to go. MEDEVACs are requested and we retask helos to help. We task the helos as fast as they can take the wounded. We receive word on the radio the *COMFORT* has no more room for the wounded and the field hospitals are full. We pass “no more MEDEVACs,” knowing there are still many who need help. We scramble to move the MEDEVACs we have already coordinated to another suitable facility and get three different orders from three different commanders for one asset. Our crew of five bring order to the chaos. The crew is mentally exhausted and frustrated we couldn't do more. Before we know it, the next Hawkeye crew is checking in and it's their turn...

This is an actual snapshot from one mission on day 11 of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE from the E-2C Hawkeye. The following account is how we found ourselves in that mission and what we learned.

It began as we left home to fly aboard for our “deployment” which was to take the USS *CARL VINSON* around South America so she could be homeported in San Diego. We were preparing to brief for carrier qualifications when we received word we would not be heading to the boat. We left that morning with the shirts on our backs only knowing we were going to support operations in Haiti from shore. There were no operation orders (OPORDs), special instructions (SPINs), or air tasking orders (ATOs). In 48 hours we were ready to conduct command and control (C2) operations from Guantanamo Bay [Gitmo] in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE.

The plan was unclear. The only thing we knew during the first few days was our mission was to support rescue operations. We could only speculate on what was expected of the helicopter squadrons on the boat. Connectivity with everyone was limited. POTS lines [shipboard telephone] were intermittent and we had no access to SIPRNET or our military email accounts. We managed to get some email through a Gmail account set-up for our squadron duty officer through a morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) internet hot spot at the air terminal in Gitmo. All of the systems we take for granted were not available operating outside normal carrier strike group environments.

Our flight schedule was written to support a 16-hour fly-day window. We had three Hawkeyes, 18 aircrew, and flew four sorties a day. The average sortie was 4.5 hours which allowed time for an airborne turnover with the off going Hawkeye. In 16 days we flew over 315 hours and 74 sorties. During that period each air-

crew averaged between 80-100 hours. The missions over Haiti involved long flight times and high task loads.

The first missions clearly defined the need for C2 in this environment. The immediate plan was to get water and food into Haiti. The first challenge was finding suitable landing fields. Helos would launch with food and water and have no place to take it. LZs safe a few minutes before were overrun with people in desperate need. Aircrews were at risk and so were the people desperately rushing them to get aid. There were communication delays between Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H), CVW-17 Charlie Papa (CP) watch onboard *CARL VINSON*, and the assets flying in the operating area. There was a lot of confusion and only clear and aggressive C2 would make this operation work.

The Hawkeyes provided the solution. We took the real-time situation report (SITREP) directly from the helicopter over the LZ and passed it to the JTF at PAP and CP. With this real time situational awareness, security forces were deployed and LZs secured. This immediate feedback allowed resources to be reallocated quickly. The Hawkeye’s communication suite was key to successful operations. Communication between the US Embassy, the JTF-H team at PAP, and CP was unreliable due to a lack of infrastructure. The need for clear airborne UHF radios with line of sight from Haiti to ships and aircraft meant the Hawkeye would become the critical C2 node for all command centers informing them of the rapidly changing situations.

Before flight operations commenced, there were no direct comms between the E-2C and the JTF in Haiti. The first helo of the day would fly a liaison (LNO) team (callsign “Jeremiah”) into PAP at sunrise. This team would be responsible for prioritizing the tasking in PAP and

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From a C2 perspective, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions resemble dynamic strike, time-sensitive targeting (TST), and close air support (CAS) missions.

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serve as the C2 coordination liaison to the US Embassy. They communicated by hand held radios, with aircraft at the airport and the Hawkeye on station. They also had intermittent POTS access, email, and eventually unclassified chat with the CP watch. While the ships communicated well with each other on SIPRNET chat, all comms into Haiti were crippled by the rough infrastructure there. These communications slowly improved over the course of the operation, but the E-2C provided reliable communications on day one.

While the E-2C's UHF comms were reliable and helped clear up much confusion, the lack of chat capability was a limitation. Jeremiah eventually used DCO NIPR chat to coordinate with *CARL VINSON* and the US Embassy. The Hawkeye has neither SIPRNET nor NIPRNET chat capability. This led to some late tasking requests and in some cases two commands would route the same request. The confusion was due to a real-time request from one commander while the same request was filtering through chat to another commander. The request would come into the Hawkeye from both commanders at slightly different times with slightly different details. Many times the crew would recognize it was the same request but other times it was tasked twice.

Tasking seemed to come from everywhere—from helicopters at remote LZs, from ships sending rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs) to a Coast Guard base on shore, from the USNS *COMFORT*, and from organic fleet support missions. However, once operations settled down, the bulk of our tasking came from CP on the *CARL VINSON*. Our Strike Group Commander, CSG-1, was assigned as CTF-41 and also Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC). Normally run by 2 watch standers, CP had an augmented team of 3-7 watch

standers working 24 hours during the operation. From a C2 perspective, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions resemble dynamic strike, time-sensitive targeting (TST), and close air support (CAS) missions. CP watch was up on both SIPR and NIPR chat. As a result, the watch was able to keep the Hawkeye abreast of pertinent comms relayed via chat.

Initially, there were 23 helos from *CARL VINSON* and other ships in the area of responsibility (AOR) providing airlift support. H-60s from HS-15, HS-11, HSC-9 and HSC-26 were assigned along with MH-53s from HM-14 and HM-15. Carrier onboard delivery (COD) detachments from VRC-30 and VRC-40 provided support to the carrier and also flew heavy lift supply missions directly into PAP from Guantanamo Bay. The basic plan was CODs and MH-53s shuttle big supplies from Gitmo to PAP during the day and evenings, and H-60s would move supplies to outlying LZs for distribution first thing in the morning. H-60s were also the main-stay of the MEDEVAC effort.

The helos were tasked with the following missions: food and water supply, MEDEVACs, security force insertion/extraction, distinguished visitor transportation, media personnel movement, medical supply, survey team insertion/extraction, as well as angel flights. Requests came from many sources, and it was not unusual to find Jeremiah, CP, and the *COMFORT* simultaneously requesting the same asset for tasking. This led to unnecessary confusion and frustration for the aircrew and often wasted limited resources. Over the course of the operation, it became clear through trial and error the most efficient way to source the various tasks was to give the tasking requests to the Hawkeye and clearly delineate the priorities. The Hawkeye aircrew would then allocate

assets based on the commander's priorities, play-time, aircraft configuration, LZ accessibility, location of pick-up and drop-off, required response time, and a variety of other dynamic variables.

The goal of effective C2 in dynamic targeting is to reduce time in the kill-chain. This same principle applies to HA/DR. Here, the goal is to minimize the time of human suffering and save lives. Just like a ground commander would request a specific capability rather than a specific platform to destroy a target, so too should supported HA/DR commanders request a specific rescue capability, instead of a specific platform. To be most effective across dynamic mission spectrums we must continue to develop training that builds on our ability to execute with C2 at the right level. While none of the training in work-ups or recent combat operations provided high fidelity training to this mission set, airborne battlefield command and control (ABC2) training provided the necessary foundation for successful Hawkeye C2. Using that process, we made fast, accurate, real-time decisions to coordinate a limited number of assets servicing a seemingly unlimited demand in a confusing C2 environment.

If a carrier strike group is tasked to support a HA/DR mission tomorrow, three tenants that can be improved are centralized command with decentralized execution, communicate commander's intent, and close integration through LNOs.

First, Hawkeye aircrew train to decentralized execution. Trust the C2 mission commander to follow the tasking priorities and to provide accurate information and status updates back to the various C2 watch standers. Also, trust the helicopter aircraft commanders (HACs) to make safe and smart decisions in the rescue space. The situation on the ground changes quickly. In a traditional strike mission we trust the

lead is qualified, experienced, and is a subject matter expert in fighting their aircraft and leading the strike. This same level of trust should be given to the Hawkeye crew and the HAC. The Hawkeye mission commander has a unique set of skills in a dynamic decision making environment. There is a broad understanding of capabilities of assets within the CSG and a broad understanding of joint asset capabilities. Hawkeye aircrews understand command by negation and train to it in the integration with the air defense commander and the sea combat commander. They understand having multiple tasking sources such as a combined air operations center (CAOC) and an air support operations center (ASOC). The mission commander understands timely and accurate information is critical to mission success. The HAC and mission commander will ask for further guidance when a situation arises that is unclear.

Second, clear overarching commander's intent is needed to provide the framework for the decisions in the rescue space. Just like rules of engagement (ROE) and SPINS need to be clear and easily understood, the same holds true for this environment. In the absence of a formal set of SPINS, a clear set of goals for the mission is essential. This can be as simple as passing the Hawkeye the overall plan for the day when they check in. The objectives should come from the JTF commander to the CP watch standers then to the Hawkeye and the assets in the rescue space.

Third, we learned having a C2 LNO between the task force commander and the Hawkeye significantly reduced confusion and expedited assistance efforts. We, as Hawkeye aircrew, were able to quickly adapt to this mission because we were able to fuse concepts and skills learned from supporting ABC2, special operations forces,

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personnel recovery, maritime interdiction, dynamic strike, air defense, maritime air superiority, and joint training. Continuing to incorporate joint training at large scale exercises such as Airwing Fallon is a step in the right direction. It was not the training in any one mission set which allowed the crew to be effective, it was incorporating specific aspects of each and using what works. This is the strength of the Hawkeye aircrew in the airwing.

The sorties flown over Haiti in the days following the disaster were challenging and rewarding flights. The environment, as well as the mission, changed on a daily if not hourly basis. The take-aways from our experience are far less tangible than a list of bullet-points or a suggested communications chain. In the Hawkeye community and in the Navy

at large, we have specific mission sets at which we are proficient, as well as detailed doctrine on how these missions are performed. What we learned during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE is the ability to think critically and solve problems cannot and should not be undervalued. In Haiti, time did not exist to wait for a fully functional command structure to be stood up. If we had the opportunity to set up the infrastructure for the ideal situation, the missions would have been very different and most likely less chaotic. The nature of HA/DR dictates there will be little to no warning such an event will occur. There can be pre-planned responses to natural disasters, but only to a limited extent. We need to use creative problem solving and the ability to think outside the box to fill in the gaps for which we simply cannot plan.



View from the cargo bay of a C-2 from VRC-40 of Tigertail 600 preparing to launch from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to support operations in Haiti. (Photo by LT Joe Holt, USN)

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## ORDER FROM CHAOS: HAITI FLIGHT OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTER

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Airplanes at Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, sit parked prior to being offloaded in support of earthquake relief efforts 17 Jan 2010. (Photo by MC2 Justin Stumberg, USN)

**By**  
**Lt Col Stephen Davidson, USAF**  
**and**  
**Maj David Smith, USAF**

On 12 January 2010, the most destructive earthquake ever recorded on the small island nation of Haiti occurred and caused wide spread devastation for more than three quarters of a million people.

Port-au-Prince's main seaport was destroyed and most roads were impassible, leaving airlift into Toussaint Louverture International Airport as the only lifeline for relief to the Haitian people.

With the control tower destroyed and airlift arriving from every corner

of the world, the volume of air traffic arriving into the airport instantly became unmanageable beyond its normal average of 25 flights per day.

Aircraft were arriving uncontrolled from all over the globe, resulting in desperately needed medical supplies, water, and food being diverted because of unmanageable congestion at the airport.

At the request of the Government of Haiti, the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron from Hurlburt Field, Florida, arrived within 24 hours of the quake, bringing some order to airfield arrivals. An average of 30 aircraft per day were now being accommodated, but excessive holding times, frequent diverts, and poor airflow management still kept signi-

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...volume of air traffic arriving into the airport instantly became unmanageable ...

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ficant relief from reaching the Haitian people.

Then entered the 601st Air and Space Operations Center's (AOC) Regional Air Movement Control Center (RAMCC) from US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). It became ground zero for the management of airflow into Haiti. This small team of US Air Force and Canadian mobility personnel established a provisional coalition organization designated as the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center (HFOCC) and was credited with streamlining a world-wide, multi-national airlift effort. Though simple in concept, their focus was critical in thwarting airport paralysis in the absence of civil support. Within 3 days of the disaster, the Haitian Government signed an agreement with the US allowing the HFOCC to control airflow into Port-au-Prince through a slot coordination program.

Despite the expertise being poured into the mix, the challenges were many. USNORTHCOM's RAMCC concept was designed for a domestic contingency, not one to be employed at a sovereign nation's busiest airfield.

Coordination went beyond the normal Federal Aviation Administration and Department of Homeland Security agencies to include the Haitian Government, the United Nations World Food Program, US Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and countless other nations.

Success was almost immediate and in keeping with the 601st RAMCC's motto, 'order from chaos' was achieved. Within the first 24 hours, slot requests exceeded 1,000 and aircraft arrival rates jumped to 168 per day.

Unexpected challenges constantly threatened to derail this well oiled machine. Countries were continuously arriving unannounced without slots, often with large aircraft.

Others would spend longer than allocated on the ramp, impacting inbound aircraft. Some aircraft broke for extended periods of time, occupying valuable ramp space already designated for incoming aircraft.

To stabilize growing unrest and to protect aid workers, the 82nd Airborne Division required a rapid deployment into Haiti. Numerous flights required insertion into an already jammed schedule while minimizing impact on international and civilian missions. Furthermore, numerous visual flight rules aircraft not visible to the HFOCC were continuously arriving, impacting parking and arrival rates.

Despite these gauntlets, the HFOCC's critical ramp coordination with Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) resulted in only two aircraft with slots diverting in the first 72 hours. Given that aircraft were arriving in a conveyor belt-like fashion every 5 minutes, it was an incredible feat by any standard.

In 2 months of operations, 3,940 fixed-wing, international flights were coordinated by the HFOCC. Over 99 percent of all aircraft inbound to Haiti, whether they had a reservation or not, successfully delivered their relief supplies. The HFOCC processed almost 6,000 requests while coordinating the air movement of 18,000 short tons and 29,000 passengers, including adoptee movements and medical evacuees. These numbers exceeded Hurricane Katrina totals.

As the saying goes, success has many fathers, and this process was no exception. The HFOCC's ability to smoothly coordinate slot times and airlift would not have been possible were it not for the herculean efforts of the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron and the JTF-PO. These professionals turned airplanes with unbelievable speed while operating on 18-hour shifts and interrupted sleep in extremely austere conditions.

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...RAMCC concept was designed for a domestic contingency, not one to be employed at a sovereign nation's busiest airfield.

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On 15 March 2010, the HFOCC was inactivated. Ramp management was transferred back to the Haitian airport manager, and the international RAMCC stood down. Before doing so however, HFOCC personnel ensured their lessons learned would be applied to future crises. The 100-page after-action report includes a “RAMCC starter kit” detailing Notice to Airmen requirements, suggested metrics, and proven organizational structures. Additionally, the Commander, Air Combat Command, and the joint doctrine development team from Air University at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, were briefed in an effort to raise awareness of the RAMCC concept and its capabilities.

Eventually, every combatant command should have a RAMCC capability. Though that capability should be specifically shaped to each specific theater of operation, some aspects should remain standardized across the commands. Items such as metrics, training tools, traffic situation displays, and organizational alignment can and should be standardized.

The HFOCC started life as a

USNORTHCOM entity. While still executing the mission, however, key HFOCC members established a RAMCC capability within US Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) 612 AOC. In less than 30 days, equipment was purchased, dedicated networks were installed, and personnel were trained.

HFOCC had a lifespan of 2 months. During which time, the founding RAMCC doctrine was stretched and reinvented. The HFOCC team drew upon the total force experience assembled from 5 countries, 6 major commands, 20 different United States Air Force specialty codes (AFSCs), the National Guard, and the Reserve. They played a vital role in the largest natural disaster relief effort ever undertaken by the United States of America and saved lives doing it. Military-centric tools were thrown out and new ones were invented. Members of the HFOCC have continued to raise global awareness of the processes and tools developed to stand up another HFOCC... whenever and wherever the next natural disaster occurs.

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Eventually, every combatant command should have a RAMCC capability.

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Combat controllers from 23rd Special Tactics Squadron, Hurlburt Field, FL, talk to aircraft circling the Toussaint Louverture International Airport. (Photo by SSgt Desiree N. Palacios, USAF)

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## BEYOND COMMAND AND CONTROL: USSOUTHCOM'S USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING TO "CONNECT AND COLLABORATE"

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Screen capture of APAN website during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE (<http://community.apan.org>).

By  
**Mr. Ricardo Arias**

### **Disaster Strikes—The Haiti Earthquake**

On 12 January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake devastated Haiti, killing over 230,000 unsuspecting victims, injuring tens of thousands more, and displacing over 1.1 million people. After struggling for decades with adversity and besieged by a myriad of social, economic, and political challenges, Haiti, its government, and its people were by most accounts already in a state of crisis. The earthquake's devastation and the aftermath shocked the world and prompted a global response. Over 800 organizations representing the whole of

society—governments and their militaries, international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), public institutions, academia, corporations, and private citizens—mobilized to provide aid and relief.

However, coordinating and managing their activities seemed a daunting, if not impossible, task. How could a global response achieve “unity of effort” when “unity of command” was not feasible?

To provide a solution, US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) looked beyond traditional command and control systems for collaboration with non-traditional partners and implemented the All Partners Access Network (APAN) in order to “connect and collaborate.” APAN effectively

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How could a global response achieve “unity of effort” when “unity of command” was not feasible?

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provided social networking and integrated web-based collaborative capabilities previously unavailable to many intended users. The web-based capabilities include file sharing, content management, and a full set of collaboration tools (chat, blog, forum, wikis), all wrapped around an unstructured social networking environment similar to Facebook.

## **Background**

USSOUTHCOM places a high emphasis on multilateral collaboration to promote security and stability in the Americas. This, along with the command's commitment to building partnerships, led to the USSOUTHCOM sponsorship of the Transnational Information Sharing Cooperation (TISC) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). TISC's primary objective was to develop unclassified information sharing capabilities to enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to "connect and collaborate" with both traditional and nontraditional partners—the US Government (USG) interagencies, IOs, partner nations (PNs), NGOs, academia, and the private and public sectors—in support of a wide range of missions such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations; stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations; and other civil-military activities.

## **USSOUTHCOM's Response**

USSOUTHCOM responded swiftly with the establishment and deployment of Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H) in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. The mission: to support USG relief efforts and contribute to HA/DR operations in Haiti. By 11 February, the US military had deployed more than 13,000 uniformed personnel, 17 ships, and over 120 aircraft, all actively supporting HA/DR and providing assistance to more than 3 million affected people.

Immediately following the earthquake, USSOUTHCOM was inundated with information and requests from a wide range of sources. Most were ad hoc emails and phone calls—offers for assistance, requests for support or information—often addressed to the wrong office or person. Regardless, even if properly addressed, answering each communication and coordinating each offer of support would have been a monumental task.

Thanks to the timing of a TISC demonstration planning conference, the TISC team and APAN administrators were at USSOUTHCOM and able to rapidly configure a community of interest (COI) for coordination of HA/DR activities. Within 24 hours of the earthquake, the Haiti HA/DR COI was operational and identified as USSOUTHCOM's primary tool for unclassified information sharing and collaboration with non-DOD responders. All ad hoc communications were referred or diverted to APAN. In the first 14 days, the COI grew to over 1,900 users, helping responders to "connect and collaborate" with other responding organizations, improving situational awareness, and facilitating information sharing on a wide range of areas: hospital status and availability; medical and food distribution locations; status and location of seaports and airports; imagery/maps; cell phone coverage; and volunteer methods.

## **Lessons Learned—Effective Tools**

Of the integrated web-based tools provided by the APAN Haiti HA/DR COI, *forums* and *blogs* proved the most useful and afforded the most utility.

**Forums:** The APAN forum tool enabled users to engage in threaded discussions similar to email but with added structure and centrally located. Forums were configured within a questions-and-answers format. Although any user could start a new

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...USSOUTHCOM was inundated with information and requests from a wide range of sources.

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forum thread at any time, Haiti HA/DR group administrators created tailored forums to support requests for information (RFIs) and requests for assistance (RFAs).

**Blogs:** The APAN blog tool enabled group owners and users to create, add, and edit unidirectional posts to the community. Blogs supported feedback from group/community members through the use of comments. The Haiti HA/DR community leveraged blogs to support posting of situation reports (SITREPs), significant events, and offers for assistance.

As the various users “felt their way” around the Haiti HA/DR community, some began by simply posting and sharing information while others quickly transitioned to using the collaboration tools to coordinate actions.

### **Success stories**

The Hospital Sacre Coeur in Milot suffered no damage from the earthquake. With a 73-bed capacity, the hospital was fully staffed, operational, and ready to begin accepting patients. Yet, even after 4 days into the crisis only six patients had been admitted. The medical staff had unsuccessfully tried to reach out to the responder community through several channels before posting/advertising their situation on APAN. Once they did and in direct response to their post, JTF-H immediately began coordinating with hospital personnel to transport injured survivors to their location. Within a week’s time the hospital had received 42 helicopter flights and admitted over 250 patients.

On January 25, an RFI was posted to APAN asking for available search and rescue teams. The post was actually a relay from a report on *Ushahidi* indicating there were calls for help coming from beneath the rubble at the Caribbean Market. Within 30 minutes, a reply was posted which provided contact

information for the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Operations Center and a contact number for the search and rescue coordination cell in Port-au-Prince. In a related thread, a potential survivor in the Caribbean Market was identified and the situation communicated via short message service. Communications engineers in turn discussed options for locating the potential survivor. The thread led to rescue workers getting to the site and effecting rescues from the Caribbean Market.

An RFA was posted to APAN from a person in an encampment near the town of Grand Goave stating food and water rations had been depleted. Through SITREP postings on APAN, it was determined a medical NGO along with US and Canadian forces had established a relief camp nearby, but this was unknown to the residents of Grand Goave. Once confirmed, the information was forwarded to the humanitarian assistance coordination cell for action. The coordination resulted in the replenishing of food and water rations.

An NGO specializing in clearing debris posted an RFI on APAN asking for guidance on the quickest means of getting people and equipment into Haiti. The NGO received responses from another NGO, the UN, and USG contacts offering both guidance and support. After the request was answered, the thread was discovered by a separate medical NGO who then used the same guidance/information to support their efforts.

A civilian medical doctor in Haiti provided a situational update, correcting false rumors of a Typhoid epidemic. The rumors had been the result of misquotes which had been compounded by translation errors in media reports and in statements by an NGO.

An RFA was posted to APAN by an NGO providing emergency

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The Haiti HA/DR community leveraged blogs...

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medical services in Haiti. The post identified the need for access to a brain scan machine. Their request was answered by a donor in Miami who had a functional CT scanner which could be donated if transportation to Haiti could be arranged. With the guidance of a USSOUTHCOM RFA manager, air transportation options for the equipment were promptly volunteered and coordinated.

An RFA was submitted to APAN by an NGO in need of 150 tents. Within 1 hour, a reply was posted indicating the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was working similar requirements and might be able to assist. Later an additional response informed the team another NGO was stationed nearby and had a number of 10-man tents available.

### **Conclusion**

Not only was APAN successful in meeting the TISC JCTD requirements,

it proved successful during Haiti relief operations. With APAN's early success and utility, the Commander, USSOUTHCOM directed the use of APAN for every PN engagement activity requiring unclassified information sharing or collaboration, making APAN a centerpiece of USSOUTHCOM communication and engagement efforts. Today, USSOUTHCOM has implemented over 30 APAN groups/ communities, poised to provide information sharing and collaboration capabilities to a wide range of activities supporting coordination of training exercises, deployments, contingency operations, and facilitating enduring forums for collaboration as COIs or communities of practice. APAN now provides a solid foundation for DOD to continue to develop and expand its capability to share information and facilitate collaboration with non-DOD actors in complex environments.

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...USSOUTHCOM directed the use of APAN for every PN engagement activity requiring unclassified information sharing...

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
Naval Air Crewman 2nd Class Jason Harold of Goldsboro, NC, transfers a young Haitian earthquake victim from an SH-60B Seahawk helicopter during a medical evacuation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. (Photo by MC2 Candice Villarreal, USN)



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## EASTERN BRIDGE: PAKISTAN FLOOD RELIEF

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Just another day at the office – Members of 621st Contingency Response Element support Pakistan flood relief efforts, July 2010. (Photo by Lt Col Shawn Underwood, USAF)

**By**  
**Lt Col Shawn Underwood, USAF**  
**and**  
**MSgt Vivian Bender, USAF**

Heavy monsoons deluged northern Pakistan in July 2010 with over 26 inches of rain, precipitating one of the worst floods in Pakistan's history. At its height, the flood waters submerged the better part of an area equivalent to a length of the eastern seaboard of the United States stretching from Maine to Georgia. Unlike an ocean tsunami, this wave moved slowly, finally cresting in southern Pakistan in late September. The flood left nearly 2,000 dead, 20 million displaced, and nearly one fifth of the country's land mass underwater.

As part of the US response, the 621st Contingency Response Wing (CRW) sent a Contingency Response Element (CRE) from Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst to Pakistan to partner with the host nation and other agencies to alleviate

the suffering and deliver aid to the people of Pakistan. The specific mission of the 621 CRE was to receive and forward deploy helicopters from the 16th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) from FT Wainwright, AL, to support the relief efforts of the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) in the southern region and to enable humanitarian assistance by USAF fixed wing assets. The CRE, consisting of a small contingent of personnel, staged out of Pakistan's Chaklala Air Force Base, a joint-use base collocated with Benazir Bhutto International Airport outside of Islamabad. During the course of the relief effort, the 621 CRE supported delivery of 1,918 tons of aid supplies (flour, water, clothes, etc.) to critical areas throughout the flooded regions of Pakistan.

There were several key partners participating in Pakistan Flood Relief. US State Department efforts were headed by the Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan

(ODR-P). Air Force fixed wing assets were coordinated via US Air Forces Central (USAFCENT) Combined Air Operations Center's (CAOC) for C-130 support and via the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center for C-17 support. In addition to Pakistani civilian and military entities, the CRE partnered closely with the Pakistani National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Pakistan's equivalent to the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

### **Understanding the Environment**

Several of the challenges faced in the flood relief were similar to challenges faced during the Pakistan Earthquake in 2005. Much like 2005, the operating environment was shaped by relationship-driven processes supported by interpersonal relationships. Team building at each level in the decision making hierarchy was crucial to the success of the CRE's mission. This focused effort enabled the CRE to effectively work solutions to arising problems and issues such as incompatibility of US and Pakistani processes and equipment (i.e., material handling equipment and cargo preparation). A major difference from the relief effort in 2005 was a shift to utilizing the host nation for base operating support and integration (BOS-I), security, and sustainment. Unlike 2005, the CRE was limited by the Pakistani government to a small contingent of personnel requiring the team to rely on the host nation and contractors for many basic needs. This placed even more focus on the ability to develop and foster relationships founded on mutual respect with key partners.

### **The Joint Air Coordination Cell**

To meet the relief needs of all entities involved, the CRE established a Joint Air Coordination Cell (JACC) as the centerpiece and starting point for the daily battle rhythm. This

meeting was chaired by a Pakistani Army General with the NDMA, chiefs, and representatives from all other nongovernmental organizations, and airlift contributors to the relief effort in attendance. Every afternoon, the group would gather, validate, and prioritize the needs from each area of the country, align suppliers with these requirements, and schedule airlift to deliver the aid. Each evening, the Air Mobility Operations Squadron (AMOS) planners would work with the CAOC to secure the airlift and the US Embassy to secure diplomatic clearances for Pakistan. Once the schedule was confirmed around midnight, the CRE would work with the various agencies to build the cargo and prepare for the first airlift aircraft at first dawn, a key process necessary to maximize airflow into the daylight-only airfields. In conjunction with JACC coordination efforts, the CRE received and supported 24-hour arrivals and departures for 16 CAB over the first few weeks.

In support of the JACC-generated missions, the CRE pushed 3-man teams forward to Skardu Airport in the north and Sialkot International Airport in the south. The focus of the aid relief was in the northern Kashmir region centered on the airfield at Skardu Airport as a central reception point. This long runway was set in a valley on the edge of the Himalayans. The opening of some roads made Skardu an excellent hub for the World Food Program to distribute supplies to the region. After sending specialists to assess the airfield, the CRE forward deployed a 3-man team to support operations. Together with the host nation they were able to work three C-17 and three C-130 aircraft a day, resulting in the delivery of over 2 million pounds of aid in just 10 days.

In Sialkot, a 3-man team led by an Air Force security forces member partnered with the Pakistani Army to prepare and upload aid for Jacobabad and Quetta, two large

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...the operating environment was shaped by relationship-driven processes...

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isolated areas in southwestern Pakistan. The partnership helped to build and load over 871,000 pounds of food and supplies over a 2-week period, enough to feed 33,000 people for a month.

### Stage Operations

At the beginning of the relief effort, US aircraft were mostly based outside the country. This scheme not only added extra flight time and lengthened duty days, but added another mission segment for weather or other operations to disrupt execution. The stage operations at Chaklala consisted of pulling two C-130 aircraft and 4 crews from Al Udeid and rotating C-17 aircraft through Manas while one C-17 remained overnight. By having the aircraft all night, the CRE was able to load and service aircraft at a more

controlled pace greatly reducing delays in delivering aid during the 2-week surge.

### Summary

Every humanitarian assistance relief effort presents its own set of unique challenges created by the context and time period in which the disaster occurs. The Pakistan Flood Relief Effort was no different. With a restricted footprint, US relief forces had to seek out the most efficient solutions available. In an environment driven by interpersonal relationships, each challenge was met with a dedicated effort to build and foster partnerships with the key personnel and entities involved. This focus on first understanding your environment followed by effecting change enabled the CRE to achieve successful results.

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...focus on  
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environment  
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change ...

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Pakistani men unload construction supplies delivered by a US Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter from 16th Combat Aviation Brigade to rebuild the homes of flood victims at Landing Zone Matlatan in Pakistan. (Photo by Sgt Jason Bushong, USA)

# JOINT HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS COURSE

By  
**Ms. Amber Callaway, OFDA**


Whether it's an earthquake, widespread flooding, or a complex emergency resulting from conflict or insecurity, disasters can strike at anytime, anyplace around the globe.

The US Agency for International Development's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA)—housed within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance—is designated as the lead US Government (USG) office to provide and coordinate USG humanitarian assistance in response to international disasters. As such, USAID/OFDA has a team of experienced humanitarian assistance professionals who are dedicated to responding to disasters abroad, no matter when or where they occur. With a staff of more than 250 personnel world-wide, USAID/OFDA responds to approximately 60 to 70 emergencies annually.

USAID/OFDA collaborates with the US military before, during, and after disasters overseas. USAID/OFDA advisors are permanently located at five geographic unified combatant commands:

- US Africa Command (USAFRICOM)
- US European Command (USEUCOM)
- US Central Command (USCENTCOM)
- US Pacific Command (USPACOM)
- US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

If unique US military capabilities are required for relief efforts, USAID/OFDA may request the utilization of military assets, including personnel, supplies, and equipment for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions overseas. During those missions, USAID/OFDA and Department of Defense (DOD) colleagues coordinate and cooperate both in the field and at headquarters.



A man displaced by Pakistan's complex emergency carries food donated by USAID. (Photo by A. Majeed, AFP)

To hone these joint response efforts, USAID/OFDA developed the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) for US military personnel in 2004. Held throughout the world nearly every week of the year, the 2-day training course consists of a combination of presentations and small-group breakout sessions including mini-tabletop exercises. The course helps US military participants become familiar with USAID and other USG and international humanitarian organizations involved in HA/DR operations abroad. The course examines USG roles and responsibilities and identifies areas of mutual coordination and cooperation between USAID and the military.

**For information on scheduling please contact the USAID/OFDA**

**Military Liaison Unit: [mlu@usaid.gov](mailto:mlu@usaid.gov).**

# CURRENT ALSA MTTP PUBLICATIONS

AIR BRANCH – POC alsaa@langley.af.mil			
TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
<b>AOMSW</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	17 NOV 08	NTTP 3-20.8 AFTTP 3-2.74	Description: This publication consolidates Service doctrine, TTP, and lessons-learned from current operations and exercises to maximize the effectiveness of "air attacks on enemy surface vessels". Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	9 JUL 05	FM 3-06.1 MCRP 3-35.3A NTTP 3-01.04 AFTTP 3-2.29	Description: Provides MTTP for tactical-level planning and execution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations. Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>IADS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	1 MAY 09	FM 3-01.15 MCRP 3-25E NTTP 3-01.8 AFTTP 3-2.31	Description: Provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures to include integration procedures. Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>JFIRE</b> <i>Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	20 DEC 07	FM 3-09.32 MCRP 3-16.6A NTTP 3-09.2 AFTTP 3-2.6	Description: Pocket size guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. Provides tactics for joint operations between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performing integrated battlefield operations. Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>JSEAD / ARM-J</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses in a Joint Environment</i> <b>Classified SECRET</b>	28 MAY 04	FM 3-01.4 MCRP 3-22.2A NTTP 3-01.42 AFTTP 3-2.28	Description: Contributes to Service interoperability by providing the JTF and subordinate commanders, their staffs, and SEAD operators a single, consolidated reference. Status: <b>Assessment</b>
<b>JSTARS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	16 NOV 06	FM 3-55.6 MCRP 2-24A NTTP 3-55.13 AFTTP 3-2.2	Description: Provides procedures for the employment of JSTARS in dedicated support to the JFC. Describes multi-Service TTP for consideration and use during planning and employment of JSTARS. Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>KILL BOX</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	4 AUG 09	FM 3-09.34 MCRP 3-25H NTTP 3-09.2.1 AFTTP 3-2.59	Description: Assists the Services and JFCs in developing, establishing, and executing Kill Box procedures to allow rapid target engagement. Describes timely, effective multi-Service solutions to FSCMs, ACMs, and maneuver control measures with respect to Kill Box operations. Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>SCAR</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	26 NOV 08	FM 3-60.2 MCRP 3-23C NTTP 3-03.4.3 AFTTP 3-2.72	Description: This publication provides strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) MTTP to the military Services for the conduct of air interdiction against targets of opportunity. Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	20 MAR 07	FM 3-50.3 NTTP 3-50.3 AFTTP 3-2.26	Description: Provides a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick reference guide of basic survival information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location. Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>TAGS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System</i> <b>Distribution Restricted/ REL ABCA</b>	10 APR 07	FM 3-52.2 NTTP 3-56.2 AFTTP 3-2.17	Description: Promotes Service awareness regarding the role of airpower in support of the JFC's campaign plan, increases understanding of the air-ground system, and provides planning considerations for the conduct of air-ground ops. Status: <b>Assessment</b>
<b>TST (DYNAMIC TARGETING)</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	20 APR 04	FM 3-60.1 MCRP 3-16D NTTP 3-60.1 AFTTP 3-2.3	Description: Provides the JFC, the operational staff, and components MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, synchronize, and prosecute TSTs within any AOR. Includes lessons learned, multinational and other government agency considerations. Status: <b>Revision</b>

## AIR BRANCH – POC alsaa@langley.af.mil

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
<b>UAS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	3 AUG 06	FM 3-04.15 NTTP 3-55.14 AFTTP 3-2.64	Description: Establishes MTTP for UAS addressing tactical and operational considerations, system capabilities, payloads, mission planning, logistics, and most importantly, multi-Service execution.  Status: <b>Revision</b>

## LAND AND SEA BRANCH – POC alsab@langley.af.mil

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
<b>ADVISING</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	10 SEP 09	FM 3-07.10 MCRP 3-33.8A NTTP 3-07.5 AFTTP 3-2.76	Description: This publication serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for, and conducting, advisor team missions. It is intended to provide units and personnel scheduled to advise foreign forces with viable TTP so they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission.  Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>AIRFIELD OPENING</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airfield Opening</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	15 MAY 07	FM 3-17.2 NTTP 3-02.18 AFTTP 3-2.68	Description: A quick-reference guide to opening an airfield in accordance with MTTP. Contains planning considerations, airfield layout, and logistical requirements for opening an airfield.  Status: <b>Assessment</b>
<b>CFSOF</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	17 MAR 10	FM 6-03.05 MCWP 3-36.1 NTTP 3-05.19 AFTTP 3-2.73 USSOCOM Pub 3-33V.3	Description: This publication assists in planning and executing operations where conventional forces and special operations forces (CF/SOF) occupy the same operational environment.  Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>CORDON AND SEARCH</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	25 APR 06	FM 3-06.20 MCRP 3-31.4B NTTP 3-05.8 AFTTP 3-2.62	Description: Consolidates the Services' best TTP used in cordon and search operations. Provides MTTP for the planning and execution of cordon and search operations at the tactical level of war.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>EOD</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	27 OCT 05	FM 4-30.16 MCRP 3-17.2C NTTP 3-02.5 AFTTP 3-2.32	Description: Provides guidance and procedures for the employment of a joint EOD force. It assists commanders and planners in understanding the EOD capabilities of each Service.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>Military Diving Operations (MDO)</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Diving Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	Jan 11	ATTP 3-34.84 MCRP 3-35.9A NTTP 3-07.7 AFTTP 3-2.80 CG COMDTINST 3-07.7	Description: This MTTP publication describes US Military dive mission areas (DMA) as well as the force structure, equipment, and primary missions that each Service could provide to a JTF Commander.  Status: <b>Signature Draft</b>
<b>MILITARY DECEPTION</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Deception</i> <b>Classified SECRET</b>	12 APR 07	MCRP 3-40.4A NTTP 3-58.1 AFTTP 3-2.66	Description: Facilitate the integration, synchronization, planning, and execution of MILDEC operations. Service as a "one stop" reference for service MILDEC planners to plan and execute multi-service MILDEC operations.  Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>NLW</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	24 OCT 07	FM 3-22.40 MCWP 3-15.8 NTTP 3-07.3.2 AFTTP 3-2.45	Description: This publication provides a single-source, consolidated reference on the tactical employment of NLWs and offers commanders and their staff guidance for NLW employment and planning. Commanders and staffs can use this publication to aid in the tactical employment of NLW during exercises and contingencies.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>PEACE OPS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	20 OCT 03 Change 1 incorporated 14 APR 09	FM 3-07.31 MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP 3-2.40	Description: Provides tactical-level guidance to the warfighter for conducting peace operations.  Status: <b>Current with Change 1</b>
<b>TACTICAL CONVOY OPERATIONS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	13 JAN 09	FM 4-01.45 MCRP 4-11.3H NTTP 4-01.3 AFTTP 3-2.58	Description: Consolidates the Services' best TTP used in convoy operations into a single multi-Service TTP. Provides a quick reference guide for convoy commanders and subordinates on how to plan, train, and conduct tactical convoy operations in the contemporary operating environment.  Status: <b>Current</b>



## LAND AND SEA BRANCH – POC alsab@langley.af.mil

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
<b>TECHINT</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Technical Intelligence Operations</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	9 JUN 06	FM 2-22.401 NTTP 2-01.4 AFTTP 3-2.63	<b>Description:</b> Provides a common set of MTTP for technical intelligence operations. Serves as a reference for Service technical intelligence planners and operators.  <b>Status:</b> Current
<b>UXO</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	16 AUG 05	FM 3-100.38 MCRP 3-17.2B NTTP 3-02.4.1 AFTTP 3-2.12	<b>Description:</b> Describes hazards of UXO submunitions to land operations, addresses UXO planning considerations, and describes the architecture for reporting and tracking UXO during combat and post conflict.  <b>Status:</b> Revision

## COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) BRANCH - POC: alsac2@langley.af.mil


TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
<b>AIRSPACE CONTROL</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	22 MAY 09	FM 3-52.1 AFTTP 3-2.78	<b>Description:</b> This MTTP publication is a tactical level document, which will synchronize and integrate airspace command and control functions and serve as a single source reference for planners and commanders at all levels  <b>Status:</b> Current
<b>BREVITY</b> <i>Multi-Service Brevity Codes</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	7 APR 10	FM 1-02.1 MCRP 3-25B NTTP 6-02.1 AFTTP 3-2.5	<b>Description:</b> Defines multi-Service brevity which standardizes air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface brevity code words in multi-Service operations.  <b>Status:</b> Current
<b>CIVIL SUPPORT</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Support Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	3 DEC 07	FM 3-28.1 NTTP 3-57.2 AFTTP 3-2.67	<b>Description:</b> Fills the Civil Support Operations MTTP void and assists JTF commanders in organizing and employing Multi-Service Task Force support to civil authorities in response to domestic crisis.  <b>Status:</b> Revision
<b>COMCAM</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	24 MAY 07	FM 3-55.12 MCRP 3-33.7A NTTP 3-13.12 AFTTP 3-2.41	<b>Description:</b> Fills the void that exists regarding combat camera doctrine and assists JTF commanders in structuring and employing combat camera assets as an effective operational planning tool.  <b>Status:</b> Assessment
<b>HAVE QUICK</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for HAVE QUICK Radios</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	7 MAY 04	FM 6-02.771 MCRP 3-40.3F NTTP 6-02.7 AFTTP 3-2.49	<b>Description:</b> Simplifies planning and coordination of HAVE QUICK radio procedures. Provides operators information on multi-Service HAVE QUICK communication systems while conducting home station training or in preparation for interoperability training.  <b>Status:</b> Current
<b>HF-ALE</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment (HF-ALE) Radios</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	20 NOV 07	FM 6-02.74 MCRP 3-40.3E NTTP 6-02.6 AFTTP 3-2.48	<b>Description:</b> Standardizes high power and low power HF-ALE operations across the Services and enables joint forces to use HF radio as a supplement / alternative to overburdened SATCOM systems for over-the-horizon communications.  <b>Status:</b> Current
<b>JATC</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	23 JUL 09	FM 3-52.3 MCRP 3-25A NTTP 3-56.3 AFTTP 3-2.23	<b>Description:</b> Provides guidance on ATC responsibilities, procedures, and employment in a joint environment. Discusses JATC employment and Service relationships for initial, transition, and sustained ATC operations across the spectrum of joint operations within the theater or AOR.  <b>Status:</b> Current
<b>EW REPROGRAMMING</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	22 JAN 07	FM 3-13.10 (FM 3-51.1) NTTP 3-51.2 AFTTP 3-2.7	<b>Description:</b> Supports the JTF staff in planning, coordinating, and executing reprogramming of electronic warfare and target sensing systems as part of joint force command and control warfare operations.  <b>Status:</b> Signature Draft
<b>TACTICAL CHAT</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Internet Tactical Chat in Support of Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	7 JUL 09	FM 6-02.73 MCRP 3-40.2B NTTP 6-02.8 AFTTP 3-2.77	<b>Description:</b> This publication provides MTTP to standardize and describe the use of internet tactical chat (TC) in support of operations. It provides commanders and their units with guidelines to facilitate coordination and integration of TC when conducting multi-Service and joint force operations.  <b>Status:</b> Current

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) BRANCH - POC: alsac2@langley.af.mil			
TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
<b>TACTICAL RADIOS</b> <i>Multi-Service Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint Environment</i> Approved for Public Release	14 JUN 02	FM 6-02.72 MCRP 3-40.3A NTTP 6-02.2 AFTTP 3-2.18	Description: Standardizes joint operational procedures for SINCGARS and provides an overview of the multi-Service applications of EPLRS. Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>UHF TACSAT/DAMA</b> <i>Multi- Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Package for Ultra High Frequency Tactical Satellite and Demand Assigned Multiple Access Operations</i> Approved for Public Release	31 AUG 04	FM 6-02.90 MCRP 3-40.3G NTTP 6-02.9 AFTTP 3-2.53	Description: Documents TTP that will improve efficiency at the planner and user levels. (Recent operations at JTF level have demonstrated difficulties in managing limited number of UHF TACSAT frequencies.) Status: <b>Assessment</b>

## SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS NEEDED UPCOMING PUBLICATIONS UNDER ASSESSMENT OR REVISION

Airfield Opening		
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Aviation Urban Operations		
POC: MAJ Brian Bolio	<a href="mailto:brian.bolio@langley.af.mil">brian.bolio@langley.af.mil</a>	757) 225-0966 / DSN 575-0966
Airborne Target Coordination and Attack Radar Systems (Formerly JSTARS)		
POC: Lt Col (S) Ray Zuniga	<a href="mailto:ray.zuniga@langley.af.mil">ray.zuniga@langley.af.mil</a>	(757) 225-0853 / DSN 575-0853
Civil Support		
POC: CDR (S) Cindy Dieterly	<a href="mailto:cynthia.dieterly@langley.af.mil">cynthia.dieterly@langley.af.mil</a>	(757) 225-0967 / DSN 575-0967
Cordon and Search		
POC: MAJ Michael Saxon	<a href="mailto:michael.saxon@langley.af.mil">michael.saxon@langley.af.mil</a>	(757) 225-0964 / DSN 575-0964
Combat Camera		
POC: Lt Col Michael Woltman	<a href="mailto:michael.woltman@langley.af.mil">michael.woltman@langley.af.mil</a>	(757) 225-0854 / DSN 575-0854
JFIRE		
POC: Maj Jeffrey Hughes	<a href="mailto:jeffrey.hughes@langley.af.mil">jeffrey.hughes@langley.af.mil</a>	(757) 225-0965 / DSN 575-0965
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# ALSA ORGANIZATION





ALSA's mission is to rapidly and responsively develop multi-Service tactics, techniques and procedures (MTTP), studies, and other like solutions across the entire military spectrum to meet the immediate needs of the warfighter.

ALSA is a joint organization chartered by a memorandum of agreement under the authority of the Commanders, Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), USMC Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), and Headquarters, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education. ALSA is governed by a Joint Actions Steering Committee (JASC) consisting of four voting and three nonvoting members.

## Voting JASC Members



RADM Wendi B.  
Carpenter

Commander, Navy  
Warfare Development  
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Maj Gen David S.  
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Commander, Curtis E.  
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US Army Combined  
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BGen Daniel J.  
O'Donohue

Director, Capabilities  
Development  
Directorate, Marine  
Corps Combat  
Development Command

## **CALLING ALL AVIATION IN URBAN OPERATIONS EXPERTS!**

Urban areas generally function as centers of social, economic, industrial, and political power. These areas facilitate formal and informal civilian and military interaction and can offer ready access to important resources, such as labor, water, technology, and information. Demographic and population trends indicate that in the future most of the world's population will reside in urban areas.

Aviation urban operations imply additional considerations are required to support friendly forces in population centers whether aviation operations are conducted independently or in conjunction with the operations of friendly ground forces.

If you were involved in any urban operations particularly Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom and participated in aviation operations supporting ground urban operations, we want to share your observations, insights, and lessons learned in the next edition! Great opportunity to enhance your professional development and get published. We're always looking for current pictures as well!

Submissions due by **1 Mar 2011** for publication in our May 2011 issue.

Send articles (**in MS Word document format**) and pictures (**in high resolution JPG format**) to:

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